I. THE ELEMENTS OF BY SE APPROACH Given the assumption that the link had no liberating properties, a prohibition in itself was an almost inevitable political conclusion: any agreement to bind a seller with significant power in the binder market was in itself illegal, if the effects of agreements on the related product market exceed a specified de minimis threshold (“a “not negligible” amount of the basic mechanism that leads to the exclusion of real and potential competitors from related security, “separation” is “separation” by engaging its competitors in the cheap market linked to an appropriate level and thus reducing their profits below the level that would justify staying active (or , alternatively , enter this market. This section continues with a detailed summary of the main documents of the post-Chicago school. However, a comparison between the commitment under US law and EU competition legislation has a significant drawback, namely that the European Commission and the European Court of Justice have looked at the link in a very small number of cases, none of which is particularly recent. 119. Chicago economists also found that tie-ins could be used to obtain discriminatory prices. Economic theory has shown that price discrimination can in principle be pro or anti-competitive, depending on a number of structural factors, but increases in most years. See Dennis W. Carlton – Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 289-91 (3d ed.
2000). Therefore, fixing practices aimed at facilitating price discrimination should normally be seen as an improvement in well-being and, therefore, as promoting competition. This is more or less the case under U.S. law; However, EU competition law considers price discrimination to be almost illegal in itself. See Richard Whish, Competition Law 657-62 (4th edition 2001). In principle, the “commercial exploitation” test proposed in the text of Section 82 is able to assess the damage and efficiency gains of competitors in the same way as the U.S. consumer demand test. However, in Tetra Pak II, the Court clarified that it does not view the “commercial use” test as a substitute for efficiency gains or damage to consumers.111 In fact, the Court found that “[t]he use [of bundled products] . . . . which may be acceptable in a normal situation in a competitive market cannot be accepted if competition is already limited.
112 shows that it will not consider such an eventuality. If taken at face value, this assertion (i.e. that the single product test is not a necessary condition for the introduction of binding conditions) would lead to a binding policy that would not only be more draconian than the rule amended in itself by Jefferson Parish, but even harsher than the strict usiary that prevailed until 1984. (5) The probability of an exit from competitors Competitiveness can be profitable privately if it leads to a market lockdown. Exit can be difficult to predict, however, as its probability depends on a) the demand links between related and related products (product complementarity, positive/negative correlation between consumer assessments for the two products); and b) market conditions that go beyond the use of fixing strategies; (z.B. the degree of product differentiation, the level of overhead costs of the competitor, its debt capacity, etc.152,169.